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1 Introduction
Despite a relative eclipse between the 1960s and 1990s, the question of value added sharing has
been a subject of intense study since the beginnings of economic science. Thus Ricardo (1817)
described it as the principal problem of Political Economy. In an article whose title paraphrases
this expression, Atkinson (2009) reviews several reasons why this issue remains important, including
the fact that it enables a link to be established between macro- and micro-economic income growth.
As Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) stress, this issue is also raised in public debate, and the changing
wage share is often seen as an indicator of how the fruits of growth are shared between production
factors.
For Ricardo, the question of value added sharing is inseparable from that of landowners’ rent.
The latter results from the farming of land of uneven fertility, and specifically from the yield
differentials offered by farmed land in relation to marginal land (where the value of the harvest
just covers the cost of production). Ricardo held that population growth would make it necessary
to use ever less productive land, leading to ever higher rents. He therefore conjectured that the
rent share in national income would tend to increase, while the profit share would tend to decrease,
with a resultant fall in investment and economic growth1.
Contrary to what Ricardo foresaw, the rent share in national income has in fact declined and
is relatively low in industrialised countries (see especially Hill (2001)). This probably explains
why rent, understood as the remuneration of non-produced factors of production such as land and
natural resources, has gradually been neglected by the literature2. The question of the distribution
of national income has thus become reduced essentially to that of the distribution between wages
and profit, as can be seen from the work of Kalecki (1938) and Kaldor (1956) and from more recent
work (see in particular Bentolita and Saint-Paul (op. cit.), Young (2011), and Zuleta and Young
(2013)).
Hill (op. cit.) reviews various possible causes of the downward trend in the rent share that
has characterised the industrialisation of Western countries. To these may be added the point
that, if we are considering natural resources in general (and not specifically land), two processes
may in the past have counteracted the increase in the rent share conjectured by Ricardo: firstly,
natural resource-saving technological progress, and secondly, repeated discoveries of new deposits
of resources. By reducing the demand for resources in the former case and reducing the marginal
costs of their exploitation in the latter case, these two processes exert downward pressure on
their price, and hence on the rent they are likely to yield. However, although these processes
of innovation and discovery are far from complete, several arguments, put forward in particular
by ecological economists, suggest that they have their limits: 1) for physical reasons, technical
progress or substitution between natural resources and man-made factors will not make it possible
to dispense with natural resources entirely; 2) the discovery of potentially exploitable new deposits
(or reserves) occurs within the context of a stock of resources that is finite; 3) although certain
resources are self-renewing by nature, their exploitation is limited by their rate of renewal, which
is bounded.
Taking the arguments of the previous paragraph carefully into account, this article aims to
reconsider Ricardo’s conjecture (i.e. the possibility of an upward trend in the rent share in value
added) in an economy with finite resources. In an endogenous growth model, we study how
the relative scarcity of a renewable resource, which is essential to production, affects the rent
associated with its exploitation and the distribution of value added (between resource, capital and
labour)3. The model is consistent with the concept of strong sustainability and assumes that the
1For Ricardo, profit alone contributes to savings and hence investment, accumulation and growth. The disap-
pearance of profit thus entails the disappearance of growth.
2Although rent is not completely ignored in some contributions, it is aggregated with other forms of property
income (as opposed to labour income) or with other income from non-produced assets (as opposed to income from
produced assets, i.e. accumulated capital). In certain recent contributions, especially the book by Askenazy et al.
(2011) and the various contributions of n◦61 of the Cahiers d’conomie Politique (Assous, 2011), rent is not explicitly
distinguished. Atkinson (2009) classes profit and rent under income from capital.
3Unlike Hill (2001), who aims to throw light on past historical reality, this exercise is more forward-looking, and
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productivity of the natural resource is bounded. Labour and capital must be allocated to three
economic activities: resource extraction, final production and research. Technical progress is the
result of research, and improves both the productivity of the factors and the quality of the final
goods. As the resource stock is finite and resource-saving technical progress is limited, indefinite
quantitative growth (in terms of the number of goods) is impossible; only indefinite qualitative
growth (in terms of the quality of goods) may be possible (as in Fagnart and Germain (2011) or
Krysiak (2006)).
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic assumptions of our
approach and its specific features, then details the model. Section 3 looks at its long-run equilib-
rium and how this equilibrium and value added sharing are affected by the scarcity of the natural
resource. The analysis is initially analytical in the context of a particular case where the capi-
tal/labour ratio is identical in all activities, and is then extended numerically to the general case.
Section 4 presents the results obtained dynamically, using a numerical approach. This analysis
firstly relates to the case where the quantity of material contained in the economy-natural resource
system is constant throughout the trajectory of the economy; we next consider a variant where a
series of discoveries gradually increases the quantity of available resource. We then analyse the role
played by the potential for technical progress in the emergence of Ricardo’s conjecture. Finally, we
study the consequences of stronger demographic pressure. The conclusion summarises the main
findings and sets out three proposals for future research.
2 The model
We propose an endogenous growth model of a decentralised economy where final production uses
an essential renewable natural resource. Our modelling is consistent with the concept of strong
sustainability, which states that the possibilities for substituting a natural resource with man-made
production factors are limited. This in turn means that the productivity of the natural resource is
bounded from above. Our model thus differs from the neoclassical growth models with resources
in the tradition of the pioneering contributions of Dasgupta-Heal (1974), Solow (1974) and Stiglitz
(1974), which allow the productivity of natural resources to grow indefinitely and are based in
this respect on the concept of weak sustainability. Growth models of neoclassical inspiration
have been criticized by ecological economics on the grounds that these models ignore the laws of
physics (in particular the laws of conservation and the second law of thermodynamics) or, more
subtly, some of the constraints imposed by these laws on production processes and technology.
Ecological economics thus emphasises that the result of unlimited growth in neoclassical models
is based either on the assumption that growth is fuelled by sectors (especially R&D) that do
not directly or indirectly require any resources (material or energy), or on the assumption that
marginal resource productivity is asymptotically infinite. However, besides the fact that every
human activity requires material and energy, various contributions (in particular Islam (1985),
Anderson (1987) and Baumga¨rtner (2004)) have shown that the property of infinite marginal
resource productivity would violate one of the above laws of physics. This further implies that
both the possibilities for substituting natural resources with other factors and the prospects for
technical progress in relation to a resource are bounded by these laws.
If these laws are taken strictly into account within the framework of a model with a renew-
able resource, Fagnart and Germain (2011) (henceforth FG) and Krysiak (2006) have shown that
indefinite quantitative growth (in terms of number of goods) is impossible. FG shows that only
indefinite qualitative growth (in terms of quality of goods) may be possible, and that quantitative
growth can only be transitional. If the economy only had non-renewable resources, there would be
no possibility of growth in the long term4.
is based on the insight that the decline in the rent share that has been observed historically could be reversed in
the future for the reasons outlined above.
4Note that this would also be the case in a single-sector neoclassical growth model with a technology of type
Y = F (K;L;R) (where Y is the output, K is capital, L is employment and R is a resource), once one assumes
1) limited substitutability between resource R and the man-made production factors (K;L) and 2) technological
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The model developed here enriches FG in several directions. FG offers only a single-sector model
without a labour factor and with a free natural resource. As there are no wages or rent and capital
is the only remunerated production factor, FG cannot be used to assess Ricardo’s conjecture or to
consider the changing distribution of value added during the transitional dynamics of an economy
with finite resources. Here we introduce a primary sector which exploits and sells the resource and
the labour factor in all productive activities.
Another limitation of FG is that a logarithmic utility function is assumed. This results in a
constant saving rate whose value is independent of any issue related to the natural resource. We
abandon this assumption here in favour of an iso-elastic utility function. The saving rate in this
model is variable, and its value (which is one of the determinants of the distribution of value added)
is affected by the abundance of the resource. It follows that this abundance also affects the ongoing
research efforts of firms, which was not the case in FG.
The model’s economy includes four types of markets: markets for final goods, the natural
resource, labour and productive capital. There are two production sectors:
(i) Prior to final production, a primary sector consists of firms that exploit the natural resource
(henceforth NR) in perfect competition; they sell it to firms in the final sector which process it.
The rent from this primary sector is Ricardian in nature: each operator has access to the resource
and these access points differ in their returns.
(ii) The final or manufacturing sector consists of firms in monopolistic competition. They have
two activities: the manufacture of final goods and research aimed at increasing the quality of these
goods. The goods produced have a resource content. Once consumed or used, they become waste,
which is recycled naturally by the environment and feeds back into the resource stock5. Research
activities that improve product quality also contribute, via an external effect, to the technical
progress that increases the productivity of the different factors.
2.1 Technological assumptions related to the resource and other factors
The final firms use the resource to produce their output. Due to technical progress resulting
from the dissemination of research efforts, the resource intensity of the manufacturing technology
decreases over time. However, for the reason explained above, this process is bounded: complete
dematerialisation of final production is deemed to be impossible, and the resource content of
these production activities tends towards a strictly positive value limit. As production activities
cannot be fully dematerialised, the same is also true of the productive capital resulting from this
production: its material resource content may be reduced over time, but it remains bounded from
below by a positive limit value. Due to the dependence of productive capital on the resource, all
activities that require capital thus indirectly require the resource.
Let us suppose capital k and labour ` needed for all business operations. These can therefore
be allocated to three different activities, indicated by e for extraction in the primary sector, f for
manufacture in the final sector and r for research in the same sector. kzt (or `zt), where z = e, f, r,
denotes the capital (or labour) allocated to activity z. To simplify the presentation of the model,
we will assume that the sectoral production functions have complementary factors. λzt will denote
the labour/capital ratio in activity z at t:
progress bounded in terms of natural resource. The best the economy can hope for in the long term is then zero
growth. Furthermore, if R was not renewable, the economy could not avoid decline, with the resource share in
value added inevitably tending towards 1 (see Eriksson, 2013, Chap. 6). In this latter case, we would end up
with a completely caricatured distribution of national income in a kind of extreme version of Ricardo’s conjecture.
Under the same assumptions of low substitution between R and (K;L) and bounded technological progress, two
merits of the modelling proposed here are that it leaves open the prospect of sustainable growth (though purely of
a qualitative nature), and avoids offering a trivial answer to the question of the distribution of value added.
5This assumption of natural recycling is made for the sake of modelling simplicity, as it removes the need to
describe a proper recycling activity. Given this assumption, the concept of NR used here refers to the great natural
cycles of carbon, nitrogen, water and so on. Sensu stricto, however, it excludes metals and other non-renewable
resources for which natural recycling is zero on a human scale.
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`zt
kzt
= λzt for z = e, f, r. (1)
The value of λzt is given in period t but decreases over time as a function of endogenous
technical progress (cf.infra).
The choice of Leontief-type production functions is dictated by our desire to choose the sim-
plest possible technology from among those consistent with the results of ecological economics.
Ecological economics distinguishes between agents inputs (or factors) and transformed inputs: the
former (capital and labour) perform the production process whereas the latter (material or en-
ergy) are transformed during this process. Given their radically different functions, there is strong
complementarity between the two types of factor, and the elasticity of substitution between them
is inevitably low (or even zero in the short term in many technologies). However, it is easier to
allow more substitutability between agent factors (labour and capital). In this respect, we could
therefore have made a more general assumption than the one used here, but it would have made
the model and discussion more complicated. In addition, the technological choices represented by
(1) do not prevent the substitutability between capital and labour at the aggregate level, through
reallocations of capital and the workforce between sectors and activities. Moreover, the sectoral
capital/labour ratios vary over time, as a function of endogenous technical progress (cf. infra).
2.2 Primary sector and operators rent
There is a continuum [0, N ] of access points to the resource (which is assumed to be homogeneous
in quality). Each access point is controlled by an operator. The maximum quantity that can be
extracted from an access point in period t depends on the overall stock of resource Rt available
in t: it is the same for the N access points, and is Rt/N . However, resource access points do not
all offer the same returns. They are classified in order of decreasing returns, with i indicating the
access point that comes in ith position. To extract a quantity xit of NR in period t, operator i
(i ∈ [0, N ]) needs a quantity of capital given by
keit =
xit
1− iN
. (2)
The most efficient operator (i = 0) therefore has a capital/output ratio of 1. At the other extreme,
the capital/output ratio of the least efficient operator (i = N) tends to infinity.
The market for the resource is competitive and the operators are price takers. Each operator i
chooses its output xit and input levels (keit, `eit) to maximise its income. Let Pxt be the sale price
of the extracted NR, Vt the cost of use of a unit of productive capital and Wt the wage paid for
one unit of work. Under (1) and (2), the unit cost of production of the operator with the highest
return (for which keit = xit) is:
Uet =def Vt + λetWt (3)
and the rent of any operator i can be written
θit =
[
Pxt − Uet
1− iN
]
xit. (4)
As the rent is linear at xit, operators can be divided into two categories: those whose rent
per unit is positive and which supply the maximum possible quantity Rt/N ; those whose rent per
unit is negative and whose supply is zero. The marginal operator, whose rent is zero, is indifferent
between operating its site and closing it temporarily. This marginal operator, indicated as nt,, is
identified by the condition θnt,t = 0: hence,
Pxt =
Uet
1− ntN
or nt = N
[
1− Uet
Pxt
]
. (5)
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As the operators i ∈ [0, nt] supply xit = Rt/N whereas the operators i ∈ [nt, N ] supply xit = 0,
the total resource output will be
Xt =
∫ nt
0
xitdi = nt
Rt
N
= Rt
[
1− Uet
Pxt
]
, (6)
with the last equality resulting from (5). The resource supply is increasing in the resource stock
and the resource price but decreasing in the prices of the agent inputs (capital and labour). (6)
can be written as a relationship between the price of the resource and the marginal operators unit
cost of extraction:
Pxt =
Uet
1− Et with Et =def
Xt
Rt
. (7)
Et is the extraction rate of the resource. In view of (2), the capital stock mobilised by all active
operators can be expressed as:
ket =
∫ nt
0
keitdi =
Rt
N
∫ nt
0
di
1− iN
= Rt ln
(
1− nt
N
)−1
= Rt ln (1− Et)−1 (8)
as nt/N = Xt/Rt(= Et) in view of (5) and (6). Like the price of the NR, the quantity of capital
used for extraction and the quantity of labour (in accordance with (1)) are therefore increasing
and convex functions of the extraction rate Et.
Finally, the extraction sector’s total rent will be
Θt =
∫ nt
0
θitdi = PxtXt − Uetket
= PxtRt
[
Et − [1− Et] ln (1− Et)−1
]
, (9)
the latter equality arising from the substitution of Xt, Uet and ket with expressions (6), (7) and
(8). The rent is therefore an increasing function of the stock of NR, its price and the extraction
rate.
2.3 The final production sector
Final production is carried out by a number of firms in monopolistic competition. These form a
continuum in the interval [0, 1]. Firm i ∈ [0, 1] is the only one to produce good i, whose price
pit and quality qit it sets in each period. The market power enjoyed by each firm prompts it to
invest in research in order to improve the quality of its output. Good i is used for consumption
or investment. The quantity of good i intended for consumption in period t is denoted cit and the
quantity intended for investment is denoted dit.
2.3.1 Final demand
We assume a horizontal differentiation model a` la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The aggregates of
consumption and investment are described by the following CES indices:
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
[ψ(qit)cit]
α
di
]1/α
and kt+1 =
[∫ 1
0
[ϕ(qit)dit]
α
di
]1/α
(10)
where 0 < α < 1. Functions ψ(qit) and ϕ(qit) are positive, continuous and increasing in qit: all
other things being equal, better quality consumer goods contribute to a higher consumer index;
similarly, better quality capital goods have greater productivity in terms of capital formation.
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Appendix 7.1 details the derivation of the demand functions cit and dit and of the consumer
and investment price indices. These latter are respectively
Pct =
[∫ 1
0
[
pit
ψ(qit)
]1−ε
di
] 1
1−ε
and Pkt =
[∫ 1
0
[
pit
ϕ(qit)
]1−ε
di
] 1
1−ε
(11)
where ε =def 1/[1−α]. Total demand for good i, yit = cit+dit, is a decreasing function of its price
and an increasing function of its quality. As Appendix 7.1 shows, the price elasticity of demand is
−, while the quality elasticity of demand is:
qit
yit
∂yit
∂qit
= (− 1)
[
cit
yit
qitψ
′(qit)
ψ(qit)
+
dit
yit
qitϕ
′(qit)
ϕ(qit)
]
. (12)
To simplify the presentation of the model, we now use the property of symmetry that charac-
terises equilibrium in monopolistic competition6 and will henceforth omit to use i to denote the
variables describing the behaviour of a monopolistic firm and demand for its output.
2.3.2 Manufacturing technology
Manufacturing a quantity yt in period t requires a quantity of material equal to
xt = [χt + µt] yt (13)
where µt(> 0) is the quantity of material incorporated in the good and χt(> 0) is the quantity
wasted during the production process. It is also necessary to use the following quantity of capital:
kft = κtyt (14)
with κt > 0. In accordance with (1), there is also a need for labour, the quantity of which is
`ft = λftkft.
The coefficients χt, µt, κt, λft decrease over time as a function of endogenous technical progress
induced by an external effect associated with firms’ research activities (cf. infra).
2.3.3 Research, innovation and technical progress
Investing in research increases the output quality, which, at a given price, stimulates demand for
that output. However, an innovative firm cannot keep its results to itself for more than one period:
at the start of period t, all firms have the same knowledge (or quality) Qt−1, which is a public
legacy of all past research efforts. If a firm invests in research in period t, it increases the quality
of its product above the average level Qt−1, and has a competitive advantage during that period
alone. Quality gains are generated deterministically: to increase the quality of its output yt to a
level qt > Qt−1, the firm must provide its research facility with a capital stock equal to
krt = h
(
qt
Qt−1
)
yt (15)
where h(·) is an increasing and convex function that satisfies h(1) = 0 (no research effort is required
to maintain the existing quality level Qt−1) and h′(1) = 0. In accordance with (1), the firm must
also hire a number of researchers equal to `rt = λrtkrt.
Moreover, the research efforts have an external effect: at the end of period t, all results become
public and firms then have free access to the quality level
Qt = Q(qit, i ∈ [0, 1]) (16)
6The property that final firms take identical decisions results from the fact that (i) final goods appear symmet-
rically in consumption and capital indices and (ii) firms have access to the same technology (which means that the
goods have the same material content).
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where Q(·) is an increasing function of the individual research efforts.
The external effect associated with this average quality level achieved at the end of period t
also engenders technical progress affecting all activities of the economy during period t + 1. The
technology coefficients χt+1, µt+1, κt+1, λft+1, λrt+1 and λet+1 change negatively as a function of
Qt. In formal terms:
χt+1 = χ(Qt), µt+1 = µ(Qt), κt+1 = κ(Qt), λzt+1 = λz(Qt) for z = f, r, e. (17)
χ(·), µ(·), κ(·) and λz(·) are monotonically decreasing functions of their argument. However, they
do not tend to zero. The crucial assumption is made that all activities (including research) directly
or indirectly require material, capital and labour. In other words, although there is no a priori
limit to the improvement of the quality of goods produced, total dematerialisation of the output
and of the production processes is impossible7. Consequently, the above technological coefficients
are bounded from below by a number of strictly positive constants:
lim
Q→+∞
χ(Q) = χ > 0, lim
Q→+∞
µ(Q) = µ > 0, lim
Q→+∞
κ(Q) = κ > 0, lim
Q→+∞
λz(Q) = λz > 0 (18)
with z = f, r, e. This reflects the fact that producing a unit of the final good will always require
a non-infinitesimal quantity of material and capital; similarly, all activities (f, r, e) will always
require a non-infinitesimal quantity of labour per unit output.
Likewise, it is assumed that:
lim
q→+∞ϕ(q) = ϕ < +∞. (19)
It is therefore impossible to produce an infinite stock of capital with a finite quantity of capital
goods, which reflects the fact that the instruments used in the production process (tools, machin-
ery and infrastructure) cannot be completely dematerialised. Consequently, research itself also
indirectly requires material. For long-run equilibrium to exist, it is necessary that ϕ > κ+ χ+ µ,
which we will assume.
2.3.4 Determining price, output and quality
In period t, each monopolistic firm chooses the levels of price pt, quality qt, output yt and inputs
kft, `ft, xt that maximise its profit
8 Πt = ptyt − Vt [kft + krt]−Wt [`ft + `rt]− Pxtxt.
Let Uzt, with z = f, r, denote the total operating cost (i.e. including labour) of a unit of capital
allocated to activity z. According to our assumptions (1), (14) and (15), we have
Uzt =def Vt + λftWt with z = f, r. (20)
The labour and capital cost of the production of yt units of goods therefore amounts to Uftκtyt.
Similarly, the labour and capital cost of the research facility of a firm of size yt is Urth (qt/Qt−1) yt.
The profit function of period t can therefore be rewritten as follows:
Πt = ptyt −
[
Uftκt + Urth
(
qt
Qt−1
)
+ Pxt [χt + µt]
]
yt. (21)
The firm’s decision problem is represented by the maximisation of (21) relative to pt and qt
subject to demand and provided that qt ≥ Qt−1 (with Qt−1 being given). These choices of pt and
qt also determine the activity level yt and the levels of capital and labour allocated to production
7This assumption, which is consistent with the results cited earlier of Anderson (1987) and Baumga¨rtner (2004),
seems eminently realistic: even services require material, energy and labour for their output, and the last of these
factors itself requires material and energy for its survival and reproduction. Although technical progress and the
reallocation of activities towards the service sector are undeniably likely to dematerialise aggregate output, the
complete dematerialisation of that output or of the production process is therefore an unachievable abstraction.
8The fact that the firm rents capital and the assumption of public access to all research results at the end of
period t (cf. (16)) make it possible to study the firms behaviour period by period.
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and research. The first-order conditions for this maximisation lead to the following equations9 (cf.
Appendix 7.2):
pt =
1
α
[
Uftκt + Urth
(
qt
Qt−1
)
+ Pxt [χt + µt]
]
(22)
Urth
′
(
qt
Qt−1
)
qt
Qt−1
= αpt
[
ct
yt
qtψ
′(qt)
ψ(qt)
+
dt
yt
qtϕ
′(qt)
ϕ(qt)
]
. (23)
Equation (22) describes the price behaviour, which is the product of the mark-up coefficient
1/α(> 1) and the marginal cost of production (the expression between square brackets10). Equation
(23) describes the optimal research investment, which must result in the marginal cost and marginal
income of an increase in quality being equal. The marginal income (which is proportional to the
right-hand expression) derives from the increase in demand caused by the increase of qt, while
the marginal cost (which is proportional to the left-hand expression) derives from the cost of the
factors involved in the increase of qt.
2.4 Households
We will consider infinite-horizon households that supply their labour inelastically and save by ac-
cumulating the physical capital that they rent out to firms. Implicitly, there are three categories
of households: the resource owners receive rent from the primary sector (Θt); the owners of the
monopolistic firms receive the net profits of the final sector (Πt); and the workers (numbering L)
receive income from the labour that they supply inelastically (WtL). The income from renting out
capital to firms Vtkt is shared between the households according to the capital they have accumu-
lated. To keep the model relatively simple, however, we will assume that households preferences
can be represented by homothetic and identical utility functions. This simplifying assumption
means that the propensity to save is independent of the level and sources of income (wages, profits
and rent), by contrast with the Kaldorian approach of Hill (2001). Under this assumption, we can
describe the households’ behaviour with reference to the behaviour of a single agent who receives
the entire macro-economic income, consumes part of it and invests the rest in the form of physical
capital.
As far as capital accumulation is concerned, we will assume (i) a one-period time to build and
(ii) a lifespan of one period11. The investment of period t thus becomes part of the capital stock
of the following period, kt+1.
The budget constraint of period t is therefore expressed as PctCt + Pktkt+1 = Vtkt + WtL +
Πt+Θt, where PctCt and Pktkt+1 denote the consumption expenditure and investment expenditure
respectively. It will be recalled that the quantities kt+1 and Ct are the Dixit-Stiglitz-type indices
given earlier and Pkt and Pct denote the capital price and consumer price indices respectively.
Households’ preferences are represented by the utility function
∑T
t=1 β
tU(ct) where 0 < β < 1
is the time discount factor, T is the time horizon (which may be infinite) and
U(Ct) =

σ
σ−1C
σ−1
σ
t if σ > 0 and σ 6= 1
ln(Ct) if σ = 1,
where σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. The intertemporal con-
9The property h′(1) = 0 ensures that qt ≥ Qt−1 is non-binding.
10Producing an additional unit requires a capital surplus (the total operating cost of which is the sum of the first
two terms) and a material surplus (the cost of which is the third term).
11This assumption of a unit depreciation rate avoids multiple generations of capital which differ from one another
in terms of material content because they have been manufactured using final goods which are ever less resource-
intensive. If capital depreciation were extended over several periods, it would be necessary to use a capital generation
model which would be much more complex than the one developed here, but which would not fundamentally change
the results obtained.
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sumption profile must satisfy the following condition:[
Ct+1
Ct
] 1
σ
= β
1 + ρt+1
Pct+1/Pct
ou` ρt+1 =def
Vt+1
Pkt
− 1. (24)
ρt+1 denotes the rate of return on capital (here on the renting out of capital) in period t+ 1.
2.5 Equilibrium
2.5.1 Economic equilibrium
At the point of symmetrical equilibrium in the final sector, (16) is reduced to Qt = Q(qt). For the
sake of simplicity, we may assume that Qt = qt. When the consumer price index Pct is normalised
to 1, the relations between the price indices and the price pt of the final goods become respectively:
1 = Pct =
pt
ψ(qt)
and Pkt =
pt
ϕ(qt)
=
ψ(qt)
ϕ(qt)
. (25)
The relations (10) can be written simply as:
Ct = ψ(qt)ct and kt+1 = ϕ(qt)dt. (26)
Henceforth, we use the lower-case letters wt, vt, pxt and uzt where z = e, f, r to denote the real
value of the variables Wt, Vt, Pxt and Uzt when these are deflated by the price of the final goods
pt = ψ(qt): wt =def Wt/ψ(qt), pxt =def Pxt/ψ(qt) and uzt =def Uzt/ψ(qt), for z = e, f, r. The real
unit costs associated with the use of the capital-labour mix can be written as:
uzt = vt + λz(qt−1)wt (27)
where vt, the real rental price of capital, is:
vt =def Vt/ψ(qt) =
Vt
Pkt−1
Pkt−1
ψ(qt)
=
1 + ρt
ψ(qt)
ψ(qt−1)
ϕ(qt−1)
. (28)
The last of these equalities follows from the definition of ρt (see 24) and the expression of Pkt in
(25).
The equilibrium conditions of the different markets are written as follows:
- Natural resource market equilibrium: The resource demand is Xt = xt (given by (13)) and
the supply-demand equilibrium is therefore given by
xt = [χ(qt−1) + µ(qt−1)] yt (29)
where supply xt satisfies the optimality condition
pxt =
uet
1− xtRt
. (30)
- Equilibrium in the final goods markets: the supply of each monopolistic firm satisfies the
demand for consumer and investment goods arising from its choices of price and quality. We have
yt = ct +
kt+1
ϕ(qt)
, (31)
with the firms’ pricing behaviour and research effort being described as follows:
α = uftκ(qt−1) + urth
(
qt
qt−1
)
+ pxt [χ(qt−1) + µ(qt−1)] (32)
urth
′
(
qt
qt−1
)
qt
qt−1
= α
[
ct
yt
qtψ
′(qt)
ψ(qt)
+
[
1− ct
yt
]
qtϕ
′(qt)
ϕ(qt)
]
, (33)
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while the intertemporal profile of household consumption satisfies the condition[
ψ(qt+1)ct+1
ψ(qt)ct
] 1
σ
= β [1 + ρt+1] . (34)
- Equilibrium in the capital and labour markets: the rental price of capital and wages adjust
so that firms rent a capital stock kft + krt + ket equal to that accumulated by households kt and
hire a number of workers `ft + `rt + `et equal to the labour supply L:
kt = κ(qt−1)yt + h
(
qt
qt−1
)
yt +Rt ln (1− Et)−1 (35)
L = λf (qt−1)κ(qt−1)yt + λr(qt−1)h
(
qt
qt−1
)
yt + λe(qt−1)Rt ln (1− Et)−1 . (36)
2.5.2 The material cycle
After consumption or scrapping, the final goods generate waste materials that are released into
the environment. These are naturally recycled and re-enter the stock of NR. At any moment, the
state of this stock therefore depends negatively on the quantity extracted by the primary sector
(the outflow) and positively on the quantity of waste recycled by the environment (the inflow).
The economy and the NR thus form a material cycle which is deemed to be closed, i.e. not to
be involved in any exchange with the outside. Under the principle of conservation of matter, the
amount of material M contained in the economy-NR system is constant. At the start of each
period t,, this material is either in the form of NR or incorporated into the installed capital stock,
or in other words (cf. Appendix 7.3):
M = Rt + µ(qt−2)
kt
ϕ(qt−1)
. (37)
In total, we therefore have a dynamic system of nine equations (29) to (37) with nine unknown
variables yt, ct, Rt, xt, kt+1, qt, ρt, pxt, wt. The initial conditions are k1, q0, q−1 and the terminal
conditions are cT = yT et kf,T+1, kr,T+1, ke,T+1 = 0.
2.5.3 Value added sharing
The macro-economic value added ptyt is divided between the wage bill WtL, the extraction sector’s
rent Θt and the remuneration of the capital factor, understood here as the sum of the rental income
Vtkt and the net profits of the monopolistic sector Πt. We will denote as γxt, γKt and γLt the
resource share, capital share and labour share in the value added respectively. We have (see
Appendix 7.4):
γxt =
Θt
ptyt
= [χt + µt] pxt
[
1 +
1− Et
Et
ln (1− Et)
]
(38)
= [χt + µt] uetG(Et) avec G(Et) =def
1
1− Et +
ln (1− Et)
Et
. (39)
It is easy to verify that for Et ∈ [0, 1], the expression in E on the right side of (38) is increasing in
E; likewise, G(E) is such that G(0) = 0 and G′(Et) > 0. The resource share thus increases as
• the price of the resource pxt increases;
• the production technology in place is more resource-intensive (i.e. is characterized by a higher
value of χt + µt);
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• the resource extraction rate Et increases: a higher extraction rate tends to increase the rent
associated with the exploitation of the resource because it takes the efficiency of the marginal
operator further away from that of the most efficient operator and thus increases the gap
between the price of the resource (which is also the unit cost of the marginal operator) and
the unit cost of the most profitable operator.
Of course, pxt is not independent of Et (cf. (30)) and the value of Et is itself dependent on
the resource-intensity of the technology. All other things being equal, more resource-intensive
technology will imply a higher value of Et and so too of pxt, all of which will contribute to a
higher resource share in the value added. With regard to Ricardo’s conjecture, it can therefore be
seen that on a growth path in which pressures on the resource intensify so that its extraction rate
and price increase, the resource share will increase unless technical progress makes it possible to
lower the technology’s resource intensity χt + µt quickly enough. Hence, in a growing economy,
Ricardo’s conjecture is all the more likely that the potential for dematerialising final output and
its production process is limited. We will return to this point in Section 4.
The total capital share in value added at t is (cf. Appendix 7.4)
γKt =
Πt
ptyt
+
Vtkt
ptyt
= 1− α+ vt kt
yt
= 1− α+ vt
[
κt + h
(
qt
qt−1
)
+
χt + µt
Et
ln (1− Et)−1
]
. (40)
As the price elasticity of final demand is constant, the share of the monopolistic sector’s net profit
in value added ptyt is constant (1−α)). The share of the rental income Vtkt will increase as the real
rental price increases and as the various activities (production, research and extraction) become
more capital-intensive. In particular, an increase in the extraction rate makes this activity more
capital-intensive and therefore increases γKt, all other things being equal.
The labour share complements the other two shares: γLt = 1− γKt − γxt. Given the impact of Et
on γxt and γKt, greater pressure on the resource will generate a less favourable added-value share
for labour, all other things being equal.
2.6 Long-run equilibrium
The technological progress resulting from research activities means that the functions κ,λf , λr, λe,
µ, χ (or ϕ) decrease (or increase) over time and ultimately reach their limit values. The economy
has then reached its long-run equilibrium which, as in Fagnart-Germain (2011), is a growth path
characterised by the constancy of the volume variables (y, c, k) or material variables (R, x) and
by the increase at a constant rate of the quality level q. Let qˆ denote the growth factor for quality
on the long-term path: (
qt
qt−1
)
long−term
=def q̂.
Let Cˆ denote the growth factor for the consumption index along this path:
Ĉ =def
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
long−term
=
ψ(qt)
ψ(qt−1)
.
The equality on the right arises because along a steady-state growth path, the growth of the
consumption index is only related to that of quality. For what follows, we assume that
ψ(q) = qη, with 0 < η ≤ 1.
In this case, Ĉ = q̂η and the steady-state expression of the condition describing consumption-
smoothing behaviour (34) is written as a positive relationship between the quality growth rate qˆ
and the rate of return on capital ρ:
q̂
η
σ = β [1 + ρ] . (41)
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Intuitively, a higher quality growth rate means a steeper growth path for the consumption index,
which is only compatible with consumption smoothing if the return rate ρ is higher. Indeed, a
higher quality growth rate requires a greater research effort and more capital investment: the
return on capital must thus increase to motivate households to make this investment.
Below, we rewrite the steady-state expressions of the equilibrium conditions (29), (31), (35), (36)
and of the material conservation equation (37) by re-expressing the level variables as variables per
worker. Thus, let y˜ denote the material output per worker: y˜ =def y/L. Likewise, the variables c˜,
k˜ and R˜ denote the per capita values of the variables c, k,R. We have:
y˜ = c˜+
k˜
ϕ
(42)
ER˜ =
[
χ+ µ
]
y˜ (43)
k˜ = κy˜ + h (q̂) y˜ + R˜ ln (1− E)−1 (44)
1 = λfκy˜ + λrh (q̂) y˜ + λeR˜ ln (1− E)−1 (45)
M
L
= R˜+ µ
k˜
ϕ
. (46)
Finally, the steady-state expressions of the optimality conditions for p and q ((32) and (33)) are
α = ufκ+ urh (q̂) + ue
χ+ µ
1− E (47)
αη
c˜
y˜
= urh
′ (q̂) q̂ (48)
where (47) uses (30), (48) makes use of the fact that the weighted sum of the right side of (23)
tends toward the product of the elasticity of ψ(q) and of c/y = c˜/y˜ in the long term; the steady-
state values of the unit cost variables (27) are given by uz = v + λzw (with z = f, r, e.) where the
steady-state level of the real rental price of capital (obtained by introducing (41) in (28)) is
v =
(1 + ρ)
qˆη
1
ϕ¯
=
(1 + ρ)1−σ
βσϕ¯
. (49)
It should be pointed out that the system’s variables only depend on the inputs of materials M
and labour L through their ratio M/L, which we will now designate as m: m =def M/L. It follows
that doubling M and L leaves m unchanged and does not affect the solution of the steady-state
system ((41)-(48): in particular, the value of y˜ is unchanged, implying that y = Ly˜ doubles like M
and L. The returns to scale of the material output y relative to the inputs M and L are therefore
constant. It follows that the returns to scale relative to each input (the other being constant) are
decreasing.
3 Comparative statics in relation to m = M/L
We will now consider how the long-run equilibrium of the model is affected by the relative abun-
dance of the material resource. There are two ways to interpret this comparative statics exercise.
On the one hand, it compares the steady-state equilibria of two economies that differ from one
another only in the level of relative abundance of the material resource. On the other hand, it
can be seen as an exercise used to identify the macro-economic consequences of stabilising the
population size at higher or lower levels, given the limited nature of the material resource. Since
the quantity M of material is an unchangeable given throughout human history, considering higher
or lower values of m thus amounts to considering different steady-state population levels for the
economy.
The study is conducted in two stages: first analytically in the context of a particular case where
the different activities are characterised by an identical capital/labour ratio, and then numerically
for the general case.
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3.1 The analytical approach in a particular case
To facilitate the analytical exploration of the steady state, it is assumed that the capital/labour
ratio is homogeneous in the different activities, i.e. that
λf = λr = λe = λ. (50)
One important consequence of (50) is that the unit cost associated with the use of the capital-
labour mix is identical in all three activities (production, research and extraction) as shown by the
expression (27): uz = v + λzw =def u for z = e, f, r. This implies the following
Lemme 1 :
If the material resource is relatively more abundant with respect to the labour input, i.e. if m is
higher,
1. it is also relatively more abundant with respect to the capital input;
2. the steady-state level of the available resource stock per capita R˜ is also higher.
In formal terms,
d(k˜/m
dm
[
or
d(k/m)
dm
]
< 0,
dR˜
dm
> 0 and, if dm > 0,
dR˜
R˜
>
dm˜
m˜
. (51)
Proof:
1. We can rewrite the equilibrium condition of the capital market as an equation that gives the
capital/output ratio (thus dividing (44) by y˜). Using (43), this gives us
k˜
y˜
= κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+ µ
E
ln (1− E)−1 . (52)
By doing the same for the equilibrium condition of the labour market, we obtain
1
y˜
= λ
[
κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+ µ
E
ln (1− E)−1
]
. (53)
Dividing (52) by (53) gives k˜ = 1/λ: capital per capita therefore does not depend on m under
assumption (50). It follows that k˜/m is smaller when m is larger.
2. As k˜ does not depend on m, (46) implies that dR˜ = dm and, if dm > 0,
dR˜
R˜
=
dm
m− µk˜/ϕ >
dm
m
.
Point 2 of Lemma 1 is a consequence of the fact that the quantity of material embodied in the
capital equipment in use
(
µk˜/ϕ
)
does not depend on m in a steady-state situation: an increase in
m therefore results in the same increase in the level of available resource R˜.
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3.1.1 The impact of m on rates (E, s, qˆ, ρ) and levels (y˜, x˜, c˜, u)
Henceforth, we use s to denote the steady-state saving rate: s =def k˜/(ϕy˜) (and hence c˜/y˜ = 1− s
via (31)12). Under assumption (50), the steady-state system can be reduced to a system of three
equations with three unknown quantities E, s and q̂ (see Appendix 7):
sϕ¯ = κ+ h (q̂)− χ+ µ
E
ln (1− E) (54)
E =
1
s
χ+ µ
mλϕ¯− µ (55)
η [1− s]
[
κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+ µ
1− E
]
= h′ (q̂) q̂. (56)
The analysis of this system leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 :
1. A greater abundance of the material resource per capita (dm > 0) implies lower steady-state
levels of the resource extraction rate and the saving rate:
sign
(
dE
dm
)
= sign
(
ds
dm
)
< 0.
2. A less severe resource constraint (dm > 0) is reflected in a higher level of final material output
per capita, of intermediate resource consumption per capita and of final material consumption
per capita. It also implies a higher real unit cost u associated with the use of the capital-labour
mix. In formal terms,
sign
(
dy˜
dm
)
= sign
(
dx˜
dm
)
= sign
(
dc˜
dm
)
= sign
(
du
dm
)
> 0. (57)
3. If the productivity of the capital goods is not too low and the saving rate is not too high, a
less severe resource constraint (dm > 0) implies a lower growth rate in the quality of final
output and the rate of return on capital. In formal terms, if ϕ¯ > 3[χ+µ], in any equilibrium
that satisfies
s <
2
3
, (58)
one has
sign
(
dq̂
dm
)
= sign
(
dρ
dm
)
< 0.
Proof: See Appendices 7.6.1, 7.6.2 and 7.6.3 for Points 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
Point 2 is intuitive and requires no special comment. Regarding Point 1, the negative relationship
between m and E results from two contradictory forces: (i) a negative effect associated with the
increase in R˜ which results from the fact that at constant output, E decreases if R˜ increases
and (ii) a positive effect associated with the increase in material output made possible by the
greater resource abundance. The first effect necessarily outweighs the second, since R˜ increases
proportionally more than m (see Lemma 1), whereas y˜ (and hence x˜) increases proportionally less
12The saving rate defined in this way corresponds to the fraction of primary income that households save (i.e. use
for the accumulation of capital), and 1−s corresponds to the fraction of primary income used for final consumption:
given the value of the ratios Pk/p and PC/p (see (25)),
Pkk
py
=
k
ϕ¯y
(
=
k˜
ϕ¯y
)
et
PCC
py
=
PC
p
ψ(q)c
y
=
c
y
(
=
c˜
y˜
)
.
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than m13. As a more abundant resource leaves k˜ unchanged (cf. Lemma 1), it inevitably implies
a fall in the saving rate (or an increase of c˜/y˜): the fall in the extraction rate reduces the capital
intensity of the extraction activity and thus the share of the output used for investment (savings).
Examination of (48) (which can be rewritten as αη[1 − s] = uh′(qˆ)qˆ) reveals why an increase
in m has two effects in opposite directions on the growth of quality qˆ: the increase in u makes
research efforts more costly and thus reduces the incentive for research. Conversely, the decline
in the saving rate (and thus the increase in 1 − s) reinforces this incentive. This is because, in
the steady state, the only remaining benefit of investment in research is an improvement in the
quality of consumer goods, and the incentive for such an investment becomes stronger as the share
of consumption in total demand increases or as the saving rate falls: the fall in s associated with
the increase in m therefore increases the marginal income from research investment (the right side
of (48)) and therefore tends to stimulate research efforts when all else is equal. Under conditions
ϕ¯ > 3[χ + µ] and (58) (a condition that is confirmed once the long-run equilibrium is calibrated
against empirically observed saving rates), the first effect necessarily outweighs the second.
Finally, note that although the aggregate value of capital per capita does not change with
m under assumption (50), a reallocation of capital is nonetheless observed between the different
activities. As dm > 0 implies a higher material output per capita, more capital (per capita) must
be allocated to final production. This results in a decrease in the capital per capita allocated to
research and extraction (ke + kr).
3.1.2 The impact of m on the real prices (w, v, px)
As u is an increasing function of m (see Proposition 1), it follows that real wages w and/or the
real rental price of capital v are higher when the resource is more abundant. We can formulate the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 Under conditions ϕ > 3[χ+ µ] and (58), a greater abundance of the resource per
capita (dm > 0) implies
• a real rental price of capital v that is lower if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption is less than one, and higher if it is greater than one:
dv
dm
 < 0 if σ < 1= 0 if σ = 1
> 0 if σ > 1;
• higher real wages if σ ≤ 1 or if σ is greater than but in the vicinity of 1.
• The abundance of the resource has an ambiguous impact on its real price px.
Proof: See Appendix 7.6.4. 
The role of σ in the impact of m on v can be understood by considering (49). Under conditions
ϕ¯ > 3[χ + µ] and (58), a higher m implies lower values of ρ and qˆ, with contradictory effects on
v: decreasing ρ tends to reduce v; decreasing qˆ does the opposite. But ρ and qˆ are linked by
(41): to be compatible with consumer behaviour, a reduction in the steady-state growth factor of
consumption (qˆη) calls for a proportional variation in [1 + ρ]σ and hence a more (respectively less)
than proportional reduction in 1 + ρ when σ is below (respectively above) than 1. The real rental
price of capital is thus decreasing in m when σ ≤ 1, as qˆη (or indeed [1 + ρ]σ) will decrease in such
a case proportionally less than 1 + ρ. Wherever v decreases (i.e. when σ ≤ 1), w must inevitably
increase. It is not impossible for wages to rise too when σ > 1 and when v is also increasing, but
this can only be formally demonstrated in the vicinity of σ = 1. Intuitively, this wage increase
13As we have explained, the returns to scale of the material output are constant relative to (M, L) and hence
diminishing relative to each input when the other is constant.
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reflects from the fact that the greater abundance of the resource relative to the available labour
force results in a greater tension between the demand for and supply of labour.
The ambiguity in the impact of m on px results from two conflicting effects of m on the marginal
operators extraction cost: a higher m lowers E but raises the unit cost u. The first effect does not
necessarily outweigh the second (as the numerical simulations confirm).
3.1.3 The impact of m on the steady-state distribution of value added
The distributive shares of the different factors can be written as follows (see Appendix 7.7.1):
γx = α
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)[
χ+ µ
]
G(E) + ϕ¯s
≤ α (59)
γK = 1− α+ [1 + ρ]
1−σ
βσ
s (60)
γL = α
ϕ¯s[
χ+ µ
]
G(E) + ϕ¯s
− [1 + ρ]
1−σ
βσ
s. (61)
Since G′(E) > 0 and the saving rate is, in view of (55), a decreasing function of E, the distributive
share of resource γx is increasing in E. The capital share, γK , is an increasing function of the
saving rate; it is increasing or decreasing in the rate of return on capital depending on whether σ
is less than or greater than 1.
The following proposition sets out how the relative abundance of the material resource affects value
added sharing among its three components.
Proposition 3 :
1. If the extraction rate of the resource is not too close to 1, the resource share in value added
is a decreasing function of its relative abundance m. In formal terms, in any steady-state
equilibrium where E satisfies the condition,
2
E
χ+ µ
mλϕ− µ +
1 + φh′
η
ϕ
mλϕ−µ − [G(E)]
2
EG′(E)
ϕ
mλϕ−µ +G(E)
> 1 ou` φh′ = qˆ
h′′(qˆ)
h′(qˆ)
> 0, (62)
one has dγx/dm < 0.
2. When σ ≤ 1, in any equilibrium satisfying (58), a greater abundance of the resource reduces
the capital share in value added and, provided E satisfies (62), increases the labour share in
value added: dγK/dm < 0 et dγL/dm > 0.
This will also necessarily be so if σ is greater than but close to 1.
Proof: Point (1) is demonstrated in Appendix 7.7.2. Point (2) follows from Proposition 1
and (60): s and ρ are lower when m is higher. When σ ≤ 1, this also implies a lower value of
γK ; hence, γL is inevitably higher (since γK and γx are both lower). When σ > 1, the negative
impact of m on both s and ρ has contradictory effects on γK . But by continuity, and at least in
the vicinity of 1, the positive effect of a reduction of ρ on γK cannot outweigh the negative effect
of the decrease of s, since the values of derivatives ds/dm, dqˆ/dm and dρ/dm are finite at σ = 1.
It is easily checked that (62) will be satisfied if E is not too close to 1
The second point of the proposition states that the capital share is inevitably a decreasing
function of resource abundance when σ ≤ 1: a higher m decreases v (see Proposition 2) and k˜/y˜
and hence vk˜/y˜. When σ > 1, v is increasing in m, but γK can still decrease if v does not increase
too much, i.e. proportionally less than the decrease in k˜/y˜. We can therefore see that, at least for
values of σ that are less than or not too much greater than 1, the distributive conflict associated
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with a more or less acute resource scarcity necessarily sets up an opposition between labour and
the other two factors: in a steady-state equilibrium, a less abundant resource implies a distribution
of value added that is less favourable to labour and more favourable to the owners of resources and
capital.
3.2 Analysis of the general case
In the general case, where the capital/labour ratio differs according to the activity, obtaining
analytical results is not easy. In particular, k˜ now depends on m, but the connection between k˜
and m cannot be established analytically: k˜ may increase or decrease when m increases, depending
on the degree of capital- and labour-intensity of the extraction activity relative to that of other
activities.
However, the results obtained from the formal analysis conducted in case (50) have some general
validity. We have studied numerically the impact of m on the steady-state equilibrium in an
economy where the different extraction, production and research activities do not have the same
capital/labour ratio. This numerical analysis14 failed to identify any configuration of parameters in
which a higher value of m would have led to a higher value for the extraction rate or the saving rate.
What is more, the increasing or decreasing nature of the relationships described in Propositions
1-3 in the particular case could not be invalidated by the numerical analysis of the more general
case.
Moreover, the simulations confirm that, depending on the circumstances, k˜ can be an increasing
or a decreasing function of m. Figure 1.1 compares the impact of m on k˜ in a case where the
labour/capital ratio is identical in all three activities and a case where it is higher in the production
activity than in the research and extraction activities (λf > λr > λe, with λf = 3λe and λr = 2λe).
If M increases, capital is reallocated from research and extraction activities towards production.
This reallocation leaves the capital stock unchanged in the case that satisfies (50), but when
production is more labour-intensive than the other activities and the labour supply is fixed, the
reallocation of capital is inevitably accompanied by a decline in total capital as shown in the figure.
Figure 1.1: Stationnary impact of m on k
identical λ’s (blue curve) versus (λf = 3λe, λr = 2λe)
 1 
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The comparison of the two above-mentioned cases is illustrated in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 with
respect to the quality growth rate and the rent share in value added. These figures confirm for the
general case the results obtained in the particular case. The simulations also confirm that px can
be an increasing or decreasing function of m, as mentioned in Proposition 2.
14The exercise consisted of varying M over a wide range around its reference value, using multiple configurations
for the values of the other parameters in the model. As L is fixed, varying M is obviously equivalent to varying m.
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Figures 1.2 - 1.3: Stationnary impact of m on qˆ (left pannel) and γx (right pannel)
identical λ’s (blue curve) versus (λf = 3λe, λr = 2λe)
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4 Dynamic analysis
The analysis of the models dynamics was performed numerically. As the model is highly schematic,
the numerical values of the simulated variables are of little interest in themselves: attention will
focus instead on the overall shape of their trajectory. It should also be borne in mind that our
exercise is meant to be forward-looking (as the economy described here only uses a renewable
resource) and does not aim to replicate historical facts or patterns relating to the distribution of
value added15.
4.1 The convergence of an initially undercapitalised economy towards
its steady-state path
The first numerical exercise illustrates the growth path of an economy whose initial state is charac-
terised by a capital stock well below its steady-state level and by the prospect of technical progress
in terms of dematerialisation and economies of labour and capital. In particular, the potential
for dematerialisation of output is still one-third of its original value. The population (the labour
supply) and the stock of material are exogenous and constant (like all other exogenous factors in
the model).
Given the potential for technical progress and the initial undercapitalisation of the economy,
the level of material output y0 is well below its steady-state level and the economy initially has
multiple growth drivers: investment in physical capital, improvements in the productivity of labour
and capital, the reduction of the dependence of final output on the resource, improvements in
quality of final output and so on.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the trajectory of material output (in blue): it increases monotonically and
tends towards a steady-state level for the reasons we have explained in the theoretical analysis: in
several dimensions (improvements in the productivity of labour and capital, the reduction of the
dependence of output on the resource), technical progress is limited, and once the variables λzt,
χt, µt, κt reach their steady-state level λz, χ, µ, κ, the growth of material output tails off. Only
quality growth remains (qˆ > 1) as shown in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.2 shows that the saving rate decreases monotonically to its steady-state level. As we
started with an initial value of capital well below its long-run level, capital is initially the factor
that most limits the economy, in contrast to the population and the resource, which are relatively
abundant. The incentive for the growth of capital and material output is therefore very strong,
as the high saving rate values illustrate. Gradually, as the economy grows, capital becomes less
scarce and its remuneration and the saving rate decrease.
15Specifically, we do not seek to ensure that the models transitional dynamics display a relatively stable value
added distribution. Such stability is still often regarded as a stylised fact of modern growth, although some would
dispute this: see in particular Solow (1958), Kra¨mer (2010) and Young (op. cit.).
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In such a simulation, the rate of extraction of the resource is subject to two opposing influences.
On the one hand, technical progress makes the production process less dependent on the resource
(χt + µt decreases), which tends to reduce extraction, all other things being equal. On the other
hand, material growth tends to increase resource requirements and the intensity of extraction: Et
tends to rise due to the increase in the material extracted and because of the decrease in Rt (due
to the accumulation of material in the installed capital)16. Unless we assume the potential for
dematerialisation to be very great (i.e. very low values of χ and µ: see Section 4.3), the second
of the two effects described above overrides the first and the extraction rate increases during the
phase of material output growth, as shown in blue in Figure 2.3. The increase in extraction costs
that accompanies the growth of Et imposes an increasing constraint on the material dimension of
economic growth, which ends up being zero as we have seen.
Figure 2.4 shows the quality growth rate, which is the only source of sustainable growth in the
model. With a delay of one period, it is identical to the rate of technical progress in the various
activities. In the simulation considered here (in blue), it is a decreasing function of time: as capital
is the limiting factor at the start of the trajectory, it restricts the number of goods that can be
manufactured. The incentive to invest in research in order to increase the quality of these goods is
therefore strong, and the greatest quality improvements are observed at the start of simulation. We
should point out that a non-monotonic evolution is possible in certain parameter configurations,
as the growth factor q̂t can increase again when material growth ceases.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the overall upwards trend in real wages and the real price of the
resource in the simulation considered here. As the economy grows, the demand for these two
factors increases, pushing their real price up. However, the change in the relative demand for
the resource and for labour depends on the potential for technical progress, which affects them
throughout the transitional dynamics: the change in real wages relative to rent therefore depends
on this too.
The changes in the resource and labour shares are described in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 respectively:
in the scenario considered here, they reflect the relative increase in the scarcity of labour and
resources as the economy grows (whereas at the start of the simulation, it is capital that is the
limiting factor). Examination of (38) shows that γx undergoes conflicting pressures during the
transitional dynamics. On the one hand, the increasing dematerialisation of output tends to reduce
it, especially as it also tends to reduce pxt and Et, all other things being equal. On the other hand,
the growth of material output resulting from the accumulation of capital and the various forms of
technical progress stimulates demand for the resource and pushes Et and pxt upwards. Unless we
assume a very high dematerialisation potential (see Subsection 4.3), the second of the two effects
outweighs the first throughout the transitional dynamics, and γx tends to increase, as shown here.
Figure 2.1: Material output Figure 2.2: Saving rate
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16However, this last effect makes little difference in the context of the simulation. This is because the material
contained in the capital changes very little, since the accumulation of material in the capital is counteracted by
the dematerialisation of output and of capital (through the reduction in the coefficient µt). Rt therefore does not
decrease by much.
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Figure 2.3: Extraction rate Et Figure 2.4: Quality growth rateqˆt	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Figure 2.8 shows that the labour share also describes a monotonic upward trend17. Depending
on the potential for technical progress that affect the resource and labour, the growth of γLt may,
however, be countered by that of γxt, as we shall see in Exercises 4.3 and 4.4.
Figure 2.7: Resource share γxt Figure 2.8: Labour share γLt	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17This trend is due to our technological assumptions and the type of simulation we are considering (in which the
economy is initially undercapitalised): as the possibilities for substitution between labour and capital are limited,
capital accumulation and the resultant economic growth are accompanied by an increase in the wage share in value
added.
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4.2 Discoveries of NR deposits
In the reference simulation, a monotonic upward development is observed in the real price of
the resource (as shown in Figure 2.5) and in γx (as shown in Figure 2.7), both in blue. Such
developments are not consistent with the downward trend in real prices of resources and the rent
share that has characterised the industrialisation of Western countries (Hill, 2001). Caution is
obviously required in interpreting the trends arising from the simulations considered here if we
are seeking to make comparisons with historical trends observed over the last two centuries. The
economy in the model only uses one renewable resource and its growth is not based in any way
on the use of non-renewable resources, unlike what has broadly been the case over the last two
centuries. However, one may wonder how the resource price and rent share develop when the
available resource is only gradually discovered.
Whereas in the previous simulation the total resource stock is available from the start, we
now consider an alternative simulation in which only a fraction of the resource stock is initially
available, the rest becoming progressively extractable as a result of a series of discoveries occurring
at regular intervals. At the end of this process of discovery, the economy has the same resource
stock as in the initial simulation. The values of the other exogenous factors are also exactly the
same in both simulations and both economies have the same steady state. The green curves in
the preceding figures show the trajectory of the simulated variables in this scenario of progressive
discoveries. The zigzags arise from the sudden emergence of discoveries.
As Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show, the change in material output and in the saving rate
respectively is similar in the two simulations. This is because capital is initially the most limiting
factor, so that the initially lower availability of the resource ultimately has little effect on material
output. However, the incentive to invest in quality is greater in the economy which is less well-
endowed with material resources (Figure 2.4).
The initial trajectories of the extraction rate, the real price of the resource and γx are very
different from those in the initial simulation. In the case of the variant with discoveries, the rent
(Figure 2.5) and γx (Figure 2.7) start with values much higher than those in the reference case,
because the material stock is smaller. Whenever a new deposit is discovered, the stock increases
and the rent and γx undergo a sudden downturn. Between two discoveries, the rent and γx start
rising again due to increase in demand driven by economic growth. These abrupt changes are
enough to cause a downward trend in γx during the discovery phase. Once the discoveries have
ceased, γx begins to increase again monotonically towards its equilibrium value. Depending on
the configuration of parameters, the trend of the price resource (across its zigzags) may be hump-
shaped as in the simulation described here, or rising (when the long-run value of γx is high).
Although the curves describing the change of real wages and of γL (Figures 2.6 and 2.8) show
the same trend in both simulations, the relative gaps are important in the early discovery phases,
with wages and γL lower in the initially less well-resourced economy. Each discovery episode has
a beneficial effect on wages and γL. Comparison between the levels of γx and γL within the two
simulations shows that the higher value of γx during the first part of the trajectory in the initially
less well-resourced economy is achieved mainly at the expense of γL: the problem of greater scarcity
in the initially less well-resourced economy mainly affects the distribution of value added between
workers and resource-owners.
4.3 The role of the potential for technological progress in relation to the
resource
This section examines the role of the varying degree of dependence of output on the resource in
the development of the resources price and its distributive share. During the transitional dynam-
ics, material output becomes ever less resource-intensive the further its dematerialisation can be
pushed: starting from given initial conditions, a strong dematerialisation potential means a lower
asymptotic value of χ + µ, enabling the economy to achieve a higher steady-state output level y,
with the same resource stock. We will now conduct a sensitivity analysis relating to this potential
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for dematerialisation.
Imagine for a moment that there is no technical progress that makes dematerialisation possible,
and no discovery of new deposits. We can understand that in these circumstances economic
growth associated with the accumulation of capital and with other sources of technical progress
will inevitably be accompanied by an increase in resource extraction and in the resource price.
This is because an increase in material output would involve placing ever-increasing demand on
the same resource stock: this would result in an increase of Et, and hence of extraction costs and
the price of the resource. As equation (38) shows, the increase in Et and pxt where χ+µ is constant
would mean that the resource share in value added would also inevitably increase throughout the
transitional dynamics.
Resource-saving technical progress that therefore reduces χt +µt exerts a force in the opposite
direction to the changes we have just described. It enables the same level of economic growth to
be achieved making less use of the resource than in the absence of technical progress, and this
will mean a smaller increase in its rate of extraction, price and value added share (38). But this
technical progress will also generate a rebound effect: it will stimulate economic growth, which
will in turn affect the extraction and price of the resource and partly offset the effect of technical
progress on these variables. If the technical progress is strong enough, (38) shows that it can
lower the value added resource share even though growth is accompanied by an increase in the
extraction of the resource and its price. If it were even stronger, so that economic growth could
be accompanied by a decrease in extraction, the transitional dynamics could even be accompanied
by a fall in the resource price as well as in the rent share.
The three figures 3.1 to 3.3 below show a sensitivity analysis of changes in the rate of extraction
of the resource, its price and its value added share according to the potential for output demateri-
alisation. The highest curve in each of the three graphs shows the changes in these variables in a
simulation where the dematerialisation potential is two times less than in the reference simulation
detailed in 4.1, which assumes a dematerialisation potential of one-third. The reference simulation
corresponds to the blue curve (the second highest curve in these first three figures). The four lower
curves describe the transitional dynamics of Et and γxt for dematerialisation potentials of 53%,
60%, 80% and 93% of the same initial value of µ0 +χ0. It can be seen that the steady-state values
for the extraction rate, resource price and resource share become lower as the dematerialisation
potential increases.
Figure 3.1: Extraction rate Et Figure 3.2: Resource price pxt
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The impact of the dematerialisation potential on the shape of these curves is consistent with
the intuition that we have outlined above. The lower the dematerialisation potential, the greater
the increase in the extraction rate, the price of the resource and its value added share during the
transitional dynamics. With a sufficiently high dematerialisation potential, the extraction rate and
the resource share may show a downward trend: this first arises with a dematerialisation potential
of 60% for the resource share (Figure 3.3) and of 80% for the extraction rate (Figure 3.1)18. The
18Ultimately, the unrealistic case of total dematerialisation ([χ+ µ]→ 0) would lead to a zero extraction rate (as
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upward trend in the resource price (Figure 3.2) remains in all cases, but becomes weaker as the
dematerialisation potential rises (even showing a slight hump in the case of a dematerialisation
potential of more than 90%).
Figure 3.3: Resource share γxt Figure 3.4: Labour share γLt
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This sensitivity analysis therefore shows that a growing economy (in which the resource deposit
discovery phase has ceased) only fails to confirm Ricardo’s conjecture if the potential for the dema-
terialisation of output is high enough. In the simulations described here, a sufficient condition for
this to occur is that technical progress is strong enough to generate an absolute decoupling of re-
source consumption and economic growth, so that the consumption of the material resource tends
to fall throughout the transitional dynamics. It should be emphasised that up to now, although
the empirical evidence may be favourable to the thesis of a relative decoupling (in some parts of
the world at least), the facts do not support the thesis of an absolute decoupling (see e.g. Laurent
(2011)).
It is also worth noting that what matters here is not the absolute level of the potential for
technical progress with regard to the resource so much as the relative value of the potential for
technological progress affecting the resource and labour. Thus, the dematerialisation potential
needed to defy Ricardo’s conjecture will be all the greater as the potential for improvements in
labour productivity rises. The steady-state expression (55) shows that at a given savings rate, the
value of E becomes higher as the labour intensity of activities is lower: for the same demateriali-
sation potential, higher labour productivity (lower λ) stimulates productive activity and resource
extraction, and hence increases E and, via E, px and γx.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the change in the labour share in value added: the lowest curve shows the
economy where the dematerialisation potential is the weakest, while the higher curves correspond to
ever higher levels of dematerialisation. Comparison between the levels of γx and γL in the different
scenarios (Figures 3.3 and 3.4) shows here again that tensions associated with the sharing of value
added arise primarily between labour and resource: from one scenario to another, an increase
in the steady-state value of either of these usually corresponds to a decrease in the value of the
other. If the potential for dematerialising final output is low (relative to possible improvements
in labour productivity), the higher tension over resource extraction means that the increase of γL
is countered by that of γx, as the labour share in value added may decrease during the phase in
which material growth comes to an end (as in the lowest curve in Figure 3.4).
4.4 The effect of varying degrees of demographic pressure
The last set of simulations examines the consequences of demographic pressure. It compares two
initially identical economies which experience population growth and progressive discoveries of
resources. In both cases, population growth continues beyond the end of the discovery phase, but
(55) shows), zero rent and, via (59), a zero resource share in the value added.
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the population of one of the economies (the blue one in the figures) stabilises before that of the
other (the green one in the figures). With a larger steady-state population (50% greater), the green
economy therefore has a lower steady-state ratio m: relative to labour, the resource constraint is
relatively more severe in the green economy.
The higher value of L enables the green economy to achieve a higher level of material output
than in the blue economy (Figure 3.1), but this obviously implies a higher resource extraction rate
(Figure 3.2). However, the greater increase of L for the same steady-state value of M implies an
increase in material output that is proportionally less than that of employment.
According to the analysis in Section 3, the lower value of m in the green economy implies higher
steady-state values in the saving rate and in quality improvements (Figures 3.3 and 3.4). In the
green economy, stronger demographic pressure reinforces the incentive to look for quality gains,
and is responsible for a non-monotonic evolution of qˆt.
The rent and the resource share in value added increase more in the economy where population
pressure on the resource is stronger (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). This greater increase in rent eventually
has an effect on wages and γL (Figures 3.7 and 3.8), which follow a bell-shaped development
curve in the economy with stronger population growth. As in Exercise 4.2, the conflict over the
distribution of value added mainly occurs between resource-owners and wage-earners.
Figure 3.1: Material output Figure 3.2: Extraction rate Et	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Figure 3.3: Saving rate Figure 3.4: qˆt	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Figure 3.5: Rent Figure 3.6: Resource share γx	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Figure 3.7: Real wages Figure 3.8: Labour share γL	  
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1 	  
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
5 Conclusion
In an endogenous growth model with a renewable natural resource, we have studied how resource
scarcity affects the economy’s growth trajectory, the rent associated with the use of the resource
and the functional distribution of value added. One particular feature of our model is that it
is based on the concept of strong sustainability, reflecting the fact that, for physical reasons,
technical progress and/or substitution between natural factors and man-made factors are limited.
The productivity of the resource is therefore necessarily bounded, which amounts to saying that
it is impossible to completely dematerialise the final output. As in Fagnart-Germain (2011), it
follows that quantitative growth (in terms of number of goods produced) can only be a transitional
phenomenon, and that only qualitative growth (in terms of quality of goods) may be possible
indefinitely.
We have proposed a Ricardo-inspired modelling of the sector that extracts the resource. The
rent from this activity turns out to be an increasing function of the rate of resource extraction,
which in this way affects the functional distribution of value added, both during the transitional
dynamics and in the long run. Regarding the long run, we studied how resource scarcity influenced
the steady-state growth path. Greater abundance of the resource leads to a higher steady-state
level of material output per capita, while making a reduction in the equilibrium extraction rate
possible. This makes the extraction activity less capital-intensive and allows a decrease in the
macro-economic saving rate. This decrease is further accentuated by the fact that the better-
resourced economy also ultimately invests less in research, with the steady-state growth rate of
output quality being reduced accordingly. The decrease in the extraction rate also changes the
distribution of value added to the advantage of the labour factor: where the resource is more
abundant, the distributive shares of the resource and of capital are lower, while wages and the
labour share are higher. Conversely, a lower per capita level of resource will change the distribution
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of value added to the detriment of the labour factor.
The dynamic analysis focused on the growth path of an economy whose initial state is charac-
terised by a capital stock well below its steady-state level and the prospect of significant techno-
logical progress. The numerical simulations show that material output increases monotonically in
this case and tends towards its steady-state level. In this simulation, the initially low capital acts
as the limiting factor in the economy at the start of the trajectory, in contrast with the population
and the resource, which are relatively abundant. Given its scarcity, the incentive to accumulate
capital is strong, as the high saving rate values show. Gradually, as the economy grows, capital
becomes less scarce and its remuneration decreases. Conversely, the relative scarcity of labour and
material increases.
In the reference simulation, in which the available resource stock is known and accessible right
from the initial state, economic growth is accompanied by increasing tensions over the resource:
as its marginal productivity is limited, its real price and distributive share rise throughout the
transitional dynamics, thus confirming Ricardo’s conjecture. If the natural resource stock is only
gradually discovered, the simulations show that successive discoveries may lead to a downward
trend in the price of the resource and its distributive share during the discovery phase. But once the
discoveries cease, the price and distributive share of the resource start to grow again, monotonically,
towards their equilibrium value. Moreover, this equilibrium value will be higher (and the upward
movement towards it more pronounced) when the transitional dynamics is accompanied by strong
population pressure or greater gains in labour productivity. When the steady-state rent share is
high, the simulations also show that the distributive conflict between resource-owners and workers
is exacerbated during the transitional dynamics, and the labour share in value added may decrease
when material growth ceases.
Our analysis therefore suggests that the historically observed decline in the resource share in
value added could be reversed in the future: under the strong sustainability hypothesis, a growing
economy where the phase of resource deposit discovery has ceased can only escape Ricardo’s con-
jecture if the potential dematerialisation of output is sufficiently great, and in particular if it makes
possible an absolute decoupling of economic growth and material consumption of resources. We
also emphasised that what matters here is not so much the absolute level of the dematerialisation
potential as the relative value of the potential for technological progress affecting the resource on
the one hand and labour on the other. Thus, the dematerialisation potential necessary to escape
Ricardo’s conjecture is greater where the potential gain in labour productivity is itself high.
The model outlined in this article could be developed in various ways that would make it possible
to assess the robustness of the results in a richer context. Three avenues for research particularly
deserve to be mentioned. The first concerns the endogenisation of the population, and in particular
that of the demographic transition. The second concerns the introduction of non-renewable natural
resources. Although these obviously cannot play a role in the long run, their gradual depletion is
nonetheless likely to affect the distribution of value added during the transitional phase, and in
particular to exacerbate the distributive conflict during this phase. Finally, following Kaldor (op.
cit.), one could consider a model in which individuals have a propensity to save that depends on
their sources (and levels) of income and in which the functional distribution of national income
therefore has additional macro-economic consequences.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Investment and consumption demands for each final good
We derive here the consumption demand for final good i. The investment demand can be derived
in the same way. For a given level of the consumption index Ct, the household chooses the vector
of final goods (cit, i ∈ [0, 1]) that minimizes the cost of Ct, i.e.
min
cit
∫ 1
0
pitcitdi s.t. Ct =
[∫ 1
0
[ψ(qit)cit]
α
di
]1/α
The Lagrangian of this problem writes as:
Lt =
∫ 1
0
pitcitdi+ νt
[[∫ 1
0
[ψ(qit)cit]
α
di
] 1
α
− Ct
]
where νt is the multiplier associated to the constraint of the minimization problem. The first-order
condition for good i leads to:
pit = νt
1
α
[∫ 1
0
[ψ(qit)cit]
α
di
] 1
α−1
α [ψ(qit)cit]
α−1
ψ(qit)
= νtC
1−α
t ψ
α(qit)c
α−1
it (63)
Multiplying the last equality by cit gives
pitcit = νtC
1−α
t [ψ(qit)cit]
α
.
Summing over i’s this last expression implies:∫ 1
0
pitcitdi = νtC
1−α
t
∫ 1
0
[ψ(qit)cit]
α
di = νtC
1−α
t C
α
t = νtCt.
The multiplier is thus the price index Pct associated to the vector of consumption goods and such
that PctCt =
∫ 1
0
pitcitdi. Consequently, (63) implies the following consumption demand for good i:
cit = ψ
ε−1(qit)
[
pit
Pct
]−ε
Ct where ε = 1/ [1− α] . (64)
After substituting cit with (64) into PctCt =
∫ 1
0
pitcitdi, one obtains the expression of the con-
sumption price index:
PctCt =
∫ 1
0
pitψ
ε−1(qit)
[
pit
Pct
]−ε
Ctdi
⇒ P 1−εct =
∫ 1
0
ψε−1(qit) [pit]
1−ε
di,
which leads to the expression given in (11).
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Proceding similarly for investment, one shows easily that the investment demand for good i is
dit = ϕ
ε−1(qit)
[
pit
Pkt
]−ε
kt+1
with the investment price index Pkt given in (11).
The total demand for good i is then
yit = cit + dit
= ψε−1(qit)
[
pit
Pct
]−ε
Ct + ϕ
ε−1(qit)
[
pit
Pkt
]−ε
kt+1. (65)
The price elasticity of demand is thus simply equal to −. Moroever,
∂yit
∂qit
=
∂cit
∂qit
+
∂dit
∂qit
= [ε− 1]ψε−2(qit)ψ′(qit)
[
Pct
pit
]ε
Ct + [ε− 1]ϕε−2(qit)ϕ′(qit)
[
Pkt
pit
]ε
kt+1
= [ε− 1]
[
ψ′(qit)
ψ(qit)
cit +
ϕ′(qit)
ϕ(qit)
dit
]
,
which leads to the expression of the elasticity of yit with respect to qit given in (12).
7.2 Price, quality, production and factor demand of a monopolistic firm
Problem (21) leads to the following first-order conditions for period t:
∂Πt
∂pt
= yt +
[
pt −
[
Uftκt + Urth
(
qt
Qt−1
)
+ Pxt [χt + µt]
]]
∂yt
∂pt
= 0 (66)
∂pit
∂qt
=
[
pt −
[
Uftκt + Urth
(
qt
Qt−1
)
+ Pxt [χt + µt]
]]
∂yt
∂qt
− Urth′
(
qt
Qt−1
)
yt
Qt−1
= 0.(67)
Multiplying (66) by pt/yt gives
pt = −pt
yt
∂yt
∂pt
[
pt −
[
Uftκt + Urth
(
qt
Qt−1
)
+ Pxt [χt + µt]
]]
.
As the price elasticity of demand is −, this expression may be rewritten as:
[− 1]pt = 
[
Uftκt + Urth
(
qt
Qt−1
)
+ Pxt [χt + µt]
]
, (68)
which is equivalent to (22).
Multiplying (67) by qt/yt gives[
pt −
[
Uftκt + Urth
(
qt
Qt−1
)
+ Pxt [χt + µt]
]]
qt
yt
∂yt
∂qt
= Urth
′
(
qt
Qt−1
)
qt
Qt−1
.
Using (68), the expression between square brackets on the left side may be shown to be equal to
pt/ and the equation may be rewritten as (23).
7.3 The dynamics of the NR
The quantity of NR extracted is sold to firms in the final sector. To produce yt, a final firm
needs quantity xt of NR (given by (29)): one fraction of the material (µ(qt−1)yt) is incorporated
29
into the goods produced and the other (Zft = χ(qt−1)yt) ends up as waste. These goods are in
turn sold to households in the form of consumer and capital goods. The consumption goods are
consumed immediately and contribute to the waste stream Zct = µ(qt−1)yt at the end of period t.
The material in the capital goods is incorporated into the capital stock operating during t+ 1. By
contrast, the capital stock used during t is scrapped at the end of this period and contributes to
the waste stream Zkt = µ(qt−2) ktϕ(qt−1)
19.
The waste generated in t by production, consumption and capital scrapping (Zft, Zct and Zkt
respectively) is assumed to be fully and immediately recycled by nature, so that it re-enters the
stock of NR at the start of t+ 1.
Given the foregoing, the dynamics of the NR can be described as follows:
Rt+1 −Rt = Zft + Zct + Zkt − xt
= χ(qt−1)yt + µ(qt−1)ct + µ(qt−2)
kt
ϕ(qt−1)
− [χ(qt−1) + µ(qt−1)] yt
= −µ(qt−1) kt+1
ϕ(qt)
+ µ(qt−2)
kt
ϕ(qt−1)
,
where use has been made of (31) and (29). This equation can also be written
Rt+1 + µ(qt−1)
kt+1
ϕ(qt)
= Rt + µ(qt−2)
kt
ϕ(qt−1)
, (69)
which expresses the fact that the material in the economy-nature system is conserved between any
two periods t and t + 1: the amount of material in the economy-nature system is constant over
time. Let M be that constant. (69) then leads to (37).
7.4 Factor shares in value added during period t
Given (9), the resource share in aggregate value added in t writes as:
Θt
ptyt
= pxt
Rt
yt
[
Et − [1− Et] ln (1− Et)−1
]
= pxt
χt + µt
Et
[
Et − [1− Et] ln (1− Et)−1
]
= uet
χt + µt
1− Et
[
1− 1− Et
Et
ln (1− Et)−1
]
.
The second equality follows from (29) and implies (38). The third follows from (7) and leads
straightforwardly to (39).
Using (21) and (22), one verifies easily that the share of monopolistic profits in value added is
a constant: Πt/ptyt = 1− α.
The total share of capital in value added is thus equal to
γKt =
Πt
ptyt
+
Vtkt
ptyt
= 1− α+ Vt
Pkt−1
Pkt−1
pt
kt
yt
= 1− α+ 1 + ρt
ψ(qt)
ψ(qt−1)
ϕ(qt−1)
kt
yt
where the last equality follows from the definition of ρt (see 24) and (25).
19The material contained in the stock kt comes from the capital goods used for its installation: kt/ϕ(qt−1) units
of these goods were needed. As they were manufactured during t − 1, each unit of good has a material content of
µt−1 = µ(Qt−2) = µ(qt−2).
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7.5 Reduction of the stationary system
Using s =def k˜/ϕy˜ in (52), one obtains (54). As R˜ =
[
χ+ µ
]
y˜/E (see 43), (46) implies
m
y˜
=
χ+ µ
E
+ sµ. (70)
The ratio between this equation and (53) writes as follows:
m =
χ+ µ
E
+ sµ
λfκ+ λrh (q̂)− λe
χ+ µ
E
ln (1− E)
. (71)
Under assumption (50), (71) and (54) imply
m =
χ+ µ
E
+ sµ
λ
[
κ+ h (q̂)− χ+ µ
E
ln (1− E)
] = χ+ µE + sµ
λsϕ
,
which leads to (55).
Furthermore, (47) and (48) imply respectively:
α = ufκ+ urh (q̂) + ue
χ+ µ
1− E (72)
αη [1− s] = urh′ (q̂) q̂. (73)
Under assumption (50), uz = u and the ratio between (73) and (72) gives
η [1− s] = h
′ (q̂) q̂
κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+µ
1−E
,
from which one obtains (56).
7.6 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
7.6.1 Sign of ds/dm, dE/dm
To study the impact of m on the stationary equilibrium, let us differentiate the system (54-56):
ϕ¯s
ds
s
= h′(qˆ)qˆ
dqˆ
qˆ
+
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
dE
E
(74)
dE
E
= −ds
s
− mλϕ¯
mλϕ¯− µ
dm
m
(75)
− s
1− s
ds
s
= −
χ+µ
1−E
κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+µ
1−E
E
1− E
dE
E
+ [1 + φh′ − η[1− s]] dqˆ
qˆ
(76)
where φh′ = qˆ
h′′(qˆ)
h′(qˆ) ≥ 0 is the elasticity of h′(qˆ) to qˆ.
From (74) and (56), one obtains that
dqˆ
qˆ
=
ϕ¯s
η[1− s]
[
κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+µ
1−E
] ds
s
−
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
η[1− s]
[
κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+µ
1−E
] dE
E
. (77)
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Note that under assumption (50), (54) may be rewritten as follows,
ϕ¯s = κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+ µ
1− E −
χ+ µ
1− E −
χ+ µ
E
ln (1− E)
= κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+ µ
1− E −
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E).
In other words,
κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+ µ
1− E = ϕ¯s+
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E). (78)
In order to shorten the forthcoming mathematical expressions, let us introduce the following no-
tation:
∆ =def ϕ¯s+
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E) (79)
Using (78) and substituting dqˆ/qˆ with (77) in (76), one obtains, after some manipulations,
−
{
s
1− s +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
]
ϕ¯s
∆
}
ds
s
= −
{
1
∆
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
] [
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
∆
}
dE
E
.
Inserting (75) in this last expression, one obtains finally a relationship between the rates of variation
of s and m:
−Λds
s
=
{
1
∆
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
] [
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
∆
}
mλϕ¯
mλϕ¯− µ
dm
m
, (80)
where Λ =
s
1− s +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
]
+
1
∆
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E > 0.
As Λ > 0, (80) establishes a negative relationship between the change in s and the change in m.
Using (80), one may rewrite (75) as a relationship between the rates of variation of E and m:
dE
E
=
{
1
Λ
[
1
∆
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
] [
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
∆
]
− 1
}
mλϕ¯
mλϕ¯− µ
dm
m
or, equivalently,
Λ
dE
E
=
{
1
∆
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
] [
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
∆
− Λ
}
mλϕ¯
mλϕ¯− µ
dm
m
.
Using the expressions of Λ and ∆, one can simplify the right side of this equality and one gets
Λ
dE
E
=
{
− s
1− s +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
] [[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
∆
− 1
]}
mλϕ¯
mλϕ¯− µ
dm
m
.
Finally, using the definition of ∆ to simplify the last term between square brackets [...], on has
Λ
dE
E
= −
{
s
1− s +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
]
ϕs
∆
}
mλϕ¯
mλϕ¯− µ
dm
m
. (81)
Because both Λ and the term between square brackets in (81) are positive, E is thus a decreasing
function of m.
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7.6.2 Sign of dy˜/dm, dx˜/dm, dc˜/dm, du/dm
7.6.1 has established that s =def k˜/ϕy˜ is decreasing in m. So is the stationary capital/output ratio
k˜/y˜: because k˜ is independant of m (cfr. Lemma 1), a higher value of m implies a higher value of
y˜ and thus also of x˜ (proportional to y˜) and c˜ (which varies by the same amount as y˜).
From (72) and assumption (50), one obtains that
u = α
[
κ+ h (q̂) +
χ+ µ
1− E
]−1
. (82)
Using (78), one rewrites (82) as
u =
α
ϕ¯s+
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
. (83)
u is thus a decreasing function of s and E, which are both decreasing in m as shown in 7.6.1: u is
thus increasing in m.
7.6.3 Sign of dqˆ/dm and dρ/dm
(77) shows that
sign
{
dqˆ
qˆ
}
= sign
{
ϕ¯s
ds
s
− [χ+ µ]G(E)dE
E
}
.
Given (80) and (81) and given that Λ > 0, one also has that
sign
{
dqˆ
qˆ
}
= sign
{
−ϕ¯s
[
1
∆
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
] [
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
∆
]
...
...+
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
[
s
1− s +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
]
ϕs
∆
]}
· sign
{
dm
m
}
,
which, using the definition of ∆, simplifies as
sign
{
dqˆ
qˆ
}
= sign
{[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
s
1− s −
ϕ¯s
∆
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E
}
· sign
{
dm
m
}
.
In the case of an increase in m, the sign of the variation of qˆ will be the same as the one of the
first term at the right-hand-side of the last equation: qˆ will thus decrease if[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
s
1− s <
ϕ¯s
∆
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E
or if
G(E)
1− s <
ϕ¯
∆
E
(1− E)2
or (using the definition of ∆) if
s+
χ+ µ
ϕ¯
G(E) < (1− s) E
G(E)(1− E)2 .
A sufficient condition for this inequality to be verified is s < 2/3 and (χ+ µ) < ϕ/3. In this case
indeed, one verifies easily that
s+
χ+ µ
ϕ¯
G(E) <
2
3
+
1
3
G(E) <
1
3
E
G(E)(1− E)2 < (1− s)
E
G(E)(1− E)2 .
The second inequality is true for any E ∈]0, 1] because EG(E)(1−E)2 −G(E) reaches a minimum of
2 when E = 0 and is increasing in E.
As ρ and qˆ are positively related (cfr. equation 41), there is also a negative relationship between
the relative variation of m and the one of ρ.
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7.6.4 Sign of dv/dm, dw/dm, dpx/dm
The link between v and m (through the negative impact of m on qˆ) follows straightforwardly from
(49). Furthermore, as u = v + λw and because u is an increasing function of m, w is necessarily
higher when v decreases or remains constant. By continuity, this is also the case when v does not
increase too much and thus at least when σ is higher than 1 and in the neighborhood of 1.
Equation (30) implies that
px =
u
1− E . (84)
The evolution of the price of the resource is the result of two contradictory effects, one positive
(and linked to the increase in u), and the other negative (linked to the decrease in E). It is not
possible to establish analytically which effect dominates.
7.7 Stationary distribution of value added
7.7.1 Expression of the stationary shares
Under assumption (50), γLt = wtLt/yt = wtλtkt/yt, so that
γKt + γLt = 1− α+ vt
kt
yt
+ wtλt
kt
yt
= 1− α+ ut kt
yt
.
It follows that
γxt = 1− (γKt + γLt) = α− ut
kt
yt
.
In a stationary state:
• k/y = ϕs and one thus obtains that γx = α − ϕsu. Replacing u by (83) in this expression,
one obtains (59).
• (24) and (26) imply that ψ(qt)/ψ(qt−1) = βσ[1 + ρ]σ and ϕ(qt−1) tends to ϕ¯. The stationary
expression of γK is thus (60).
The expression of the stationary share of labour in the added value (γL) is obtained as the com-
plementary of γx + γK .
7.7.2 Proof of point 1 of Proposition 3
From the stationary expression (59) of γx, one gets that
dγx
γx
=
ϕ¯s
∆
[
φG
dE
E
− ds
s
]
with φG = E
G′(E)
G(E)
≥ 1.
φG is the elasticity of G(E) with respect to E and is increasing in E. One knows that a higher m
implies lower values of E and s. It will also imply a lower value of γx if the term between square
brackets in the above expression is negative, i.e. if
φG
[
−dE
E
]
>
[
−ds
s
]
. (85)
Let us identify under which condition this will be the case when dm/m > 0. Using (80) and (81),
φG
[
−dE
E
]
−
[
−ds
s
]
=
1
Λ
{
φG
s
1− s +
[
1 + φh′
η[1− s] − 1
]
φGϕs−
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
∆
− 1
∆
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E
}
mλϕ¯
mλϕ¯− µ
dm
m
.
(86)
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As Λ is positive, (86) will be positive if the term between curly brackets {...} at the right side of
this expression is positive. This will be the case if
φGs+ Λ
[
1 + φh′
η
− [1− s]
]
φGϕs−
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
∆
>
1
∆
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E [1− s]. (87)
Note that
χ+ µ
1− E
E
1− E =
χ+ µ
(1− E)2
G(E)E
G(E)
= [χ+ µ]G(E)[1 + φG].
After inserting this last expression in right-hand-side of (87) and rearranging terms, one can rewrite
the inequality (87) as
φGs+
[
1 + φh′
η
− [1− s]
]
φGϕs
∆
>
1 + φh′
η
[χ+ µ]G(E)
∆
+ [1− s][1 + φG − 1]
[
χ+ µ
]
G(E)
∆
(88)
or (using the definition of ∆ to simplify the terms in [1− s])
φGs+
1 + φh′
η
φGϕs
∆
>
1 + φh′
η
[χ+ µ]G(E)
∆
+ [1− s]φG. (89)
Dividing this inequality by φG, on obtains finally
2s+
1 + φh′
η
ϕ¯s− [χ+ µ]G(E)/φG
∆
> 1 (90)
where ϕ¯s− [χ+ µ]G(E)/φG ≥ 0 because (54) implies that
ϕ¯s >
[
χ+ µ
] ln[1− E]−1
E
where
ln[1− E]−1
E
≥ 1 ≥ [G(E)]
2
EG′(E)
=
G(E)
φG
≥ 0,
for 0 ≤ E ≤ 1.
Using (55) and the definition of ∆, one can rewrite (90) as
2
χ+ µ
mλϕ¯− µ
1
E
+
1 + φh′
η
ϕ¯
mλϕ¯−µ −G(E)/φG
ϕ
mλϕ−µ +G(E)
> 1, (91)
which is equivalent to (62). The value of the product of the two last fractions at the left-hand-side
of (91) decreases from 1+φh′η > 1 when E = 0 towards 0 when E = 1. The condition (91) will thus
be satisfied if E is not too close to 1.
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